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TIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO CONFER DEGREES
By Dean Oliver A. Harker, College of Law, University of Illinois.
Although mandamus has been in use as a judicial writ for more
than five hundred years and has for the last two hundred years
been used in a great variety of cases, it has not until recently
been called into requisition to compel the conferring of degrees
by educational institutions.
Originally, the writ.was a mere mandate, issuing directly from
the King to the subject, to compel the performance of the royal
will. It was in no sense judicial, but prerogative, and as such
was used by the King as a police regulation in preserving the
peace of the realm.
In the course of time, however, and especially during the strug-
gle between parliament and the King, its arbitrary use as a royal
mandate for police regulation, merely, was discontinued, and it
became a judicial writ by which the Court of King's Bench as-
sumed the right to correct and remedy official inaction, and to
compel inferior courts, tribunals, and officers to do their duty.
Originally the King sat in person in this court, and when he
ceased to do so, yet by a fiction of the law, he was presumed to
be present. At first the writ was issued from the King's Bench
only in cases in which the King or the public at large were inter-
ested, and for that reason was called .a prerogative writ, and not
one of right to be invoked by the individual. A growing tendency
to strip it of its prerogative character and treat it as a writ of
right marked its increasing use, however, and, to-day, it is almost
universally regarded in the nature of a suit between parties, where
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the aggrieved party shows himself entitled to the particular relief
sought. In his excellent treatise on mandamus, High 1 uses this
language: "The remedy by mandamus, as discussed and illus-
trated in the preceding chapters, has been shown to be sub-
stantially a civil Temedy in its nature, and one which is applied
for the protection of purely civil rights."
The remedy is open to a party who seeks it for the purpose of
enforcing a private right, as well as for the enforcement of a
public one. If it be a case of the first kind it must clearly appear
that the petitioner's individual rights are affected. If it be a case
of the latter kind, the petitioner need not show anything beyond
his interest as a citizen. The granting of the writ rests largely in
the discretion.of the court, however, and with great uniformity it
is held that it should not be awarded in a doubtful case, or a case
where it will prove barren or fruitless. To be more soecific, to
entitle the applicant to the writ, he must show a clear legal right
to have the act sought by it done, and in the manner sought; that
it was the defendant's imperative duty to perform the act; that
at the time it is sought- to coerce him, it is yet within the power
of the defendant to perform, and that the case is one in which the
remedy would be effectual. In its early use as a judicial writ it
was a rule of universal application that mandamus would not
lie where there was another specific remedy-open to the petitioner.
But if the refusal of the defendant to perform be clearly shown
and it clearly appears that the petitioner's rights are thereby in-
juriously affected, a growing tendency on the part of courts in
this country, federal and state, to award the writ even where
another remedy exists, is manifest, especially if the other remedy
be insufficient to place the party in the same position he occupied
before the omission of the party complained of or would have oc-
cupied had the duty been performed. In a number of jurisdictions
it has been held that if the other remedy afforded but a tedious
method of redress and one where delay was likely to result in
material injury, it would be no bar to the writ. In some of the
states, notably, Illinois, it is provided by statute that the exist-
ence of another adequate legal remedy does not bar the petitioner.
And so, it may be said, there has been for the last fifty years or
more a general trend toward enlarging the scope of the writ, both
as to variety of cases and as to effectuating redress for the appli-
cant.
I Sect. 430.
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Where the duty to perform is judicial or requires the exercise
of discretion upon the part of the defendant, courts are quite cau-
tious in awarding the writ. In such a case the function of the
writ is merely to set in motion. If the defendant be a judicial
officer, it may require him to decide the controverted question and
pronounce judgment, but will not direct how the question be de-
cided or what judgment be rendered. If the defendant be an offi-
cer clotlied with discretion, it may require him to exercise the dis-
cretion, but will not direct how it be exercised.
The courts have at times been embarrassed in determining what
constitutes a ministerial duty as distinguished from a discretionary
duty. It is not always easy to determine where the line of de-
markation lies. Where the law prescribes and defines the duty to
be performed with such certainty as to leave nothing to the ex-
ercise of discretion, the act is ministerial. A ministerial duty, as
understood and defined by the courts, is an absolute and impera-
tive duty, the discharge of which requires neither the exercise of
discretion nor judgment. On the other hand, discretion is the
power or right conferred by law upon an official to act according
to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled
by the judgment or conscience of others. The exercise of official
discretion or the performance of a judicial act usually involves
some ministerial duty. For instance, a board of aldermen may be
charged with the duty of deciding by resolution a question of
municipal policy: the introduction of the resolution and placing it
before the body for vote are ministerial acts, while the decision of
the question by vote is an exercise of discretion. A judge by
statute may be required to convene and organize his court on a
certain day, to keep a docket for all cases and call them for trial
in a certain order, and in the performance of those duties he
acts in a ministerial sense; but when he, in the trial of a case,
passes upon the admissibility of testimony, grants or refuses in-
structions, or decides the case, he acts in a judicial sense. The
embarrassment to the courts above mentioned has chiefly arisen
in just such cases--cases where ministerial acts and those of a
discretionary character, to be performed by the same official, are
closely interwoven.
That courts will not interfere by mandamus in the discharge of
a discretionary act is subject to the exception of abuse of discre-
tion. Where it is clearly shown that the action taken was arbi-
trary, capricious, dictated by selfish motives, or amounts to a wil-
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ful evasion of duty, the court will not hesitate to review and
control. The doctrine may be very well illustrated by two nota-
ble cases. In the case of the People ex rel. Sheppard v. The Illi-
nois State Board of Dental E'xaminrs,2 the petitioner, a citizen
of the State of Illinois, and a graduate of the Indiana Dental
College, applied to the Supreme Court of Illinois for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Illinois State Board of Dental Examin-
ers to issue to him a license to practice dentistry. Under an act
to insure the better education of practitioners of dental surgery,
the defendant board was authorized to conduct examinations 
of
applicants for a license to practice, and no person was allowed
to practice without such license. The act also provided that 
the
board should at all times issue a license to any regular graduate 
of
any reputable college without examination upon the payment 
of
a certain fixed fee. In his petition the relator showed that 
the
Indiana Dental College was an institution duly organized under
the laws of Indiana for the purpose of educating persons in 
the
theory and practice of dental surgery; that it had a full corps 
of
professors, who gave complete courses of instruction, and 
that
it was a reputable school of the kind; that he had attended such
college as a student for the required length of time, had 
pur-
sued all courses of study tinder the direction and tuition 
of the
professors, and had graduated from the same; that he presented
his diploma to the board, together with the required fee, and 
de-
manded a license to practice dentistry, which the board refused.
The Supreme Court held that the board was clothed with the 
dis-
cretion of determining what was a "reputable dental college";
and that as it had decided that the Indiana College was 
not a
reputable one, the relator was not entitled to a writ of mandamus
in the absence of an averment and proof that the board 
had, in
so deciding, abused the discretion with which it was clothed.
In the Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. The People
ex rel. Cooper,3 the relator applied for a writ to compel the 
board
to issue to him a license upon a diploma of the Northwestern 
Col-
lege of Dental Surgery, and showed that he had, as a 
student,
successfully completed the course of that institution which, 
as he
averred, was a reputable dental college. It appeared 
from the
petition that the relator, on November 4, 1884, rriatriculated 
as a
student in the Chicago College of Dental Surgery, in 
which
21o Ill., So.
3 123 Ill., 227.
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four of the five members of the board were instructors, and pur-
sued his studies for one year; that in November, 1885, he entered
the Northwestern College of Dental Surgery, a rival to the
Chicago College of Dental Surgery, and there completed his
course; that the refusal of the board to give him a license was
through malice, because he had left the Chicago College and
entered the other institution. The court held upon demurrer to
the petition that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of
the board; that while it had a right to decide whether the college
at which the applicant for license was reputable or not, it must
decide the question upon just and fair principles. It held that
if the members of the board were making use of their power
under the state law to build up their-own institution and crush
out a rival, as was averred and admitted by the demurrer, they
were acting from selfish and improper motives, and that man-
damus was the proper remedy to control their action.
Although a great majority of cases .in mandamus have been
against judicial, state and municipal officers and corporations
serving the public for profit under charters granted by the state,
its use to compel school officers to establish, maintain, and regu-
late schools has not.been infrequent. Courts have readily awarded
the writ to compel school trustees to perform their ministerial
duties in building school houses and furnishing proper school
facilities, to compel school superintendents to examine teachers
and act upon their applications, to compel school directors ,to
admit duly qualified pupils, or to reinstate those who had been
illegally expelled. Acting in such cases, however, the courts have
been careful not to invade the discretionary authority vested in
the officials sought to be coerced. The cases, too, have been chiefly
ones in which the schools were equipped and maintained, directly*
or indirectly, by taxation. How far the courts will go in regu-
lating the action of trustees and superintendents of denomina.
tional and private schools, open to the public upon the payment
of tuition, is a matter largely of conjecture. Certainly, a dis-
tinction shourd be observed between schools which are supported
by taxation (those which are public in the highest sense) and
those which are not supported by taxation, but are creatures of
private enterprise. To illustrate: A court will not hesitate to
compel the trustees of a public school, possessing funds for that
purpose, to enlarge the facilities for accommodating an increase
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of students. It would hesitate to coerce the trustees of a private
institution to do such a thing.
As stated at the beginning of this article, not until quite re-
cently has the aid of mandamus been invoked to coerce the
trustees and faculties of universities, colleges, and professional
schools into conferring degrees; and in the few published cases
where the question is involved there does not appear entire uni-
formity of opinion.
In State ex rel. Burg z,. Milwaukee Medical College et al.,
4
the relator in his petition showed that he, in i9o2, matriculated as
a student in the Milwaukee Medical College, a chartered institu-
tion of learning, with authority to confer degrees and issue
diplomas, and registered in the department of dentistry; that he
attended for the full three years required, paid all the fees re-
quired, pursued all courses required for the degree of Doctor of
Dental Surgery as set forth in the published announcement of the
college, and successfully passed all final examinations; that he
had fulfilled all conditions required of a fihatriculated student,
but that the college authorities refused to confer upon him a de-
gree or issue to him a diploma.
The return admitted the allegations of the petition and set tip
in justification of the refusal to confer the degree that the state
board of dental examiners, about the time the relator matricu-
lated, abrogated a rule which enabled him to make up certain de-
ficiencies in entrance requirements during the first year of his at-
tendance, and passed a rule compelling all entrance requirements
to be completed before registration; that the relator was notified
of the change after he had matriculated, but continued in attend-
ance, and that in March, 1905, the defendant received notice from
the state board of dental examiners that the relator, because of
his failure to comply with the rule relative to entrance require-
ments, should not be graduated and should receive no credit for
his first year's work in the dental department. There being no
dispute about the facts, the only question submitted for decision
in the Circuit Court was whether the defendants were justified
in refusing the diploma by following the requirements of the
Wisconsin State Board of Dental Examiners. The court found
that it was not a sufficient justification and awarded the writ.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment was reversed
and the writ quashed, but not upon the ground that the justifica-
4128 Wis., 7.
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tion pleaded was sufficient and should have been sustained. Thejudgment was reversed upon a point not raised by counsel for
the defendant, either in their printed brief or on oral argument.
In the reported opinion the court, admitting the conten-
tion of the relator that he contracted with the Milwaukee Medical
College for a course in its dental department, and completed the
prescribed course, paid the required fee, performed all the condi-
tions to be performed on his part, that under the terms of the
contract and the performance thereof he became entitled to a
diploma, and that the same had been refused, held that "the case
made is clearly one of breach of contract, and that mandamus will
not lie to compel a private corporation to perform its contract."
Announcing the doctrine that "duties imposed upon corpora-
tions, not by virtue of express laws or by the condition of their
charters, but arising out of contract relations, will not be en-
forced by mandamus," the court holds in effect that although a
student may have fulfilled all the requirements for a degree an-
nounced by a college corporation, as to entrance, attendance, pay-
ment of fees, courses of study, passing of examinations, and
moral character, and although it is the clear duty of the college
authorities to confer on him the degree which is arbitrarily and
from improper motives refused, yet the college cannot by man-
damus be coerced to a performance of its duty.
Under the doctrine laid down in this case, I cannot conceive of
a student's case so strong in facts as to entitle him to mandamus.
With all due respect to the high character of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, I cannot but feel that the soundness of the holding
is open to question. It must be conceded, of course, that the gen-
eral rule is that a right resting in contract cannot be enforced
through mandamus. All students of the question understand that
the remedy can be used only to enforce the performance of
duties resulting from an office, trust, or station; but where the
contract gives the relator the right to come within the class en-
titled to enforce the performance of a duty devolving upon one
holding an office, trust, or station, and the right of the relator is
in the nature of a privilege, it should be no objection to enforce
such duty by mandamus that the relator brought himself within
the class by making a c6ntract.
Quite a different holding is made in People ex rel. Cecil v.
Bellevue Medical College.5 In that case Cecil, a student, applied
14 N. Y. Supp., 49o.
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for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to admit him
to final examination, and on his passing, to confer on him the
degree of Doctor of Medicine. The evidence showed the re-
spondent to be a medical college, incorporated under the laws of
New York, for the purpose of giving instruction in medicine. It
issued circulars, wherein it specified the fee to be paid by students,
the courses of study, and the qualifications which students must
possess to entitle them to the degree of Doctor of Medicine. The
relator entered the college for the purpose of taking the regular
courses of study and procuring the degree. At the end of the
course, and after fulfilling all the conditions entitling him to final
examination, he was informed by the secretary of the faculty that
he would not be admitted to final examination, and .hat the col-
lege would not confer a degree upon him. It does not appear
upon what grounds the refusal was based; but the court declined
to award the writ and the relator appealed. In reversing the
order, Van Brunt, P. J., speaking for the court, used the follow-
ing language: "When a student matriculates under such cir-
cumstances, it is a contract between the college and himself that
if he complies with the terms prescribed therein, he shall have
the degree, which is the end to be obtained.. This corporation can-
not take the money of a student, allow him to remain * * * *
and then arbitrarily, when he has completed his term of study,
refuse to confer upon him that which it has promised, namely,
the degree of Doctor of Medicine, which authorizes him to prac-
tice that so-called science. It may be true that this court will
not review the discretion of the corporation in the refusal for any
reason or cause to permit a student to be examined and receive a
degree; but where there is an absolute and arbitrary refusal, there
is no exercise of discretion. It is nothing but a wilful violation
of the duties assumed."
In People ex rel Jones v. New York Homeopathic Medical Col-
lege and Hospital," the relator, a student in the defendant college,
claiming that he had performed all the duties required of him and
passed all of his examinations, applied for a writ to compel the
defendant to issue to him a diploma. The doctrine announced in
People ex rcl. Cecil v. Bellcvuc Medical College, that mandamus
is available to compel an educational institution to perform its
agreement in matter of conferring degrees and issuing diplomas,
was recognized, although the writ was denied. It was denied be-
a 2o N. Y. Supp., 379.
THE USE OF MAND.M3IUS 349
cause under the rules of the college a student's right to a diploma
was dependent upon a decision of the medical faculty as to his
qualification and a recommendation to the board of trustees, and
the medical faculty had declined to approve the relator's qualifi-
cations and recommend him for a diploma.
The right to the writ to enforce performance of a contract of a
like kind Was also. recognized a year later, in People ex tel.
O'Sullivan v. New York Law School et al.1 In that case a law
student, who had completed the prescribed course and passed the
final examinations, applied for and obtained a writ compelling the
law school authorities to confer on him the degree of Bachelor
of Laws. Although the order was reversed, the court being of
the opinion that the court below invaded the discretionary au-
thority of the defendants to refuse the degree to a contumacious
student, the principle involved in the Cecil case was recognized.
The question was recently before the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, Baltimore University v. Colton.s In that case Colton, who
had leen a student in the law school of the Baltimore University,
was notified by the law faculty that he would not be admitted to
final examinations and would not be considered as a candidate
for graduation. He applied for and obtained from the Baltimore
City Court a writ of mandamus. On appeal one of the points of
contention made by the university was that the rights of the peti-
tioner arose out of a contract with a private corporation and that
they could not be enforced by action of mandamus. The Court of
Appeals overruled the contention, and held that neither a suit at
law to recover damages for breach of contract nor a bill in equity
for specific performance constituted a remedy, barring the right
of the petitioner to compel his re-instatement as a student and
candidate for the degree of Bachelor of Laws.
Conceding that the writ may be awarded to compel the per-
formance of a contract where the performance would invest the
petitioner with some special honor or privilege and that an aca-
demic or professional degree is such, how far the courts will go
in regulating the acts of those clothed with the authority to con-
fer degrees becomes a very serious question.
Quite an interesting case is now pending in the Superior Court
in Chicago, Orin R. Wakefield v. The Board of Trustees of the
University of Illinois et al. Wakefield matriculated in the Uni-
7 N. Y. Supp., 663.
'98 Maryland, 623.
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versity of Illinois in June, 1906, and registered in its college of
medicine, located in Chicago. After he had attended as a student
for the required four years and had pursued the prescribed course
of study, the medical faculty refused to recommend him to the
trustees for graduation, because of poor scholarship and because
he had failed in final examination to pass a required course de-
nominated Medicine. The passing grade in all departments of
the university is 70 on a scale of 100. Wakefield had taken all
the required courses and a number of electives. He was obliged
to pass in four thousand hours' of work, required and elective.
He passed in five thousand, although the grade he received in a
large part of his work was only 70.
To a petition for mandamus to compel the trustees to confer
on the petitioner the degree of Doctor of Medicine the defendant
answered, justifying the action of the medical faculty and setting
up that the petitioner was not entitled to the degree because of
his poor scholarship,, generally, and because he had failed to pass
in a required course. To meet the contention of the petitioner
that he had passed final examinations in a thousand hours' more
work than that actually required for graduation, and was, there-
fore, entitled to his degree, the answer recited a rule adopted by
the university authorities that, "a student having grades below
75 in subjects aggregating twenty-five per cent of his entire work,
should not be graduated," and charged that the petitioner came
within the inhibition contained in the rule. The petitioner replied
as to the matter set up in justification, that his failure to pass
final examination in Medicine, a required course, did not bar his
right to a degree for the reason that the medical faculty had
adopted a rule which allowed a student to graduate who had not
failed in more than two courses, and that he should not be barred
because of poor examination grades, for the reason that his grades
were withheld from him during the four years of his attendance
and that the only notification that he had ever received with refer-
ence to them was that he had "passed." To the replication the
trustees demurred and upon argument contended that the rule
of the medical faculty which allowed a student to graduate who
had not failed in more than two courses did not divest the faculty
of its discretion, but left it with the right to recommend or to
refuse to recommend for degree a student who had failed in not
more than two courses. The faculty might be willing to so
recommend as to a student who had made exceptionally good
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grades in all but two minor courses and refuse recommendation
as to a student of poor grade who had failed in only one impor-
tant course. It was, also, contended that it was a matter of dis-
cretion whether grades be given out or withheld from students-
a discretion with which the court should not interfere. The
court, McSurely presiding, sustained the demurrer and, in refus-
ing to carry the demurrer back to the answer, held that the mat-
ters therein specifically set up were sufficient. The case is still
pending upon the issue, raised by an amended replication, that the
discretion vested in the medical faculty has been abused.
Ii conclusion, I desire to emphasize the thought that in all
such applications for this extraordinary writ the courts will avoid
much embarrassment by standing close to the landmark, estab-
lished early in the development of the remedy, that in matters re-
quiring the exercise of official discretion the courts will only com-
pel the official to act and not undertake to control his judg-
ment. The rule is most admirably stated in High on Extraordi-
nary Legal Remedies,' as follows: "Whenever officers or bodies
are vested with discretionary power as to the performance of any
duty required at their hands, or where in reaching a given result
of official action, they are necessarily obligated to use some de-
gree of judgment and discretion, while mandamus will lie to set
them in motion and to compel action on the matters in con-
troversy, it will in no manner interfere with the exercise of such
discretion, nor control or dictate the judgment or decision which
shall be reached."
The faculties of educational institutions having power to con-
fer degrees, and teachers in any particular department of a uni-
versity having the right to recommend to the trustees of the uni-
versity students deemed to be worthy of degrees, are necssarily
vested with large discretion in determining who shall receive
those honors, or be recommended for such distinction. They pre-
scribe the courses of study, the length of time they shall be pur-
sued, and the degree of efficiency which students must attain in
them; they decide upon methods of instruction and methods by
which efficiency may be tested, and, by quizzes and final examina-
tions, make the tests. They have the authority to regulate the
conduct of students as to study, recreation, and social enjoyment.
In exercising their authority over the student, both as to study
and general conduct, to the end that he may be best prepared for
0 Page 26.
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a life of usefulness, they must be vested with broad discretion.
They know more about such matters than the courts or anyone
else. Their habits of thought, study, and life better fit them for
the exercise of correct judgment than others, and, except in
clear cases of abuse of discrdion, courts should keep their hands
off.
Oliver A. Harker.
University of Illinois.
